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MARIA LUCIA TARANTINO 
 
Adult Stem Cell Therapy: Social Risks 
 
Abstract: Adult stem cell therapy is also recommended because it doesn’t present the risk of rejection 
due to immunological incompatibility. But such therapy meets risks and limits in the concept of human 
nature we assume behind the concept of sick person. There is in fact a map of concepts of human nature. 
The most important are: the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept which considers man in all his dimensions; 
the utilitarian concept (Hume); the instinctual concept (Nietzsche); the concept of sexual urges (Freud). 
Only the first catches the truth around human nature. Stem cell therapy meets therefore, along the 
anthropological line of research, the limit of knowledge as manifestation of the vision of all the 
dimensions of human nature. As a consequence, it happens that stem therapy, without knowledge to guide 
its practice, is forced to serve science that, in turn, supports individualism deprived of its power and/or 
its sexual urges. Hence the risk that such therapy, wrongly used, ends up violating the classical precepts 
of justice as a result: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. 
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PART ONE 
Summary:  1 – Stem cell therapy with adult stem cells: introductory remarks; 2 – Legitimacy and limits of 
therapy with adult stem cells; 3 – Legitimacy and limits of stem cell therapy with umbilical cord cells; 4 – 
Limits of stem cell therapy with embryonic stem cells. 
 
1. Stem cell therapy with adult stem cells: introductory remarks 
Stem cell therapy with adult stem cells is preferable to stem cell therapy with embryonic 
stem cells because 
     a – it does not involve the risk of immunological rejection 
     b – it is likely to be therapeutically successful  
     c – stem cell therapy with embryonic stem cells is not advisable 
Adult stem cells in fact have already been satisfactorily employed for various 
therapeutic procedures and it seems that they are the basis of future regenerative 
therapies. 
     However, before deciding to use adult stem cell therapy it is necessary to know the 
reason for the cells being used. And even before specifying the reason for their use it is 
essential that their natural function be remembered. And while the reason can be 
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inferred from their properties, their natural function should be explained. Their function 
can be defined as their capacity to replicate themselves indefinitely and as their ability 
to differentiate, that is to give life to specific cells through a process of differentiation. It 
should also be remembered that their presence in various tissue is different; in some it is 
higher and in others it is lower, it is higher in tissue in which during the lifetime of the 
individual a certain renewal of cells has been necessary, while it is lower in tissue in 
which renewal of cells has been less frequent. 
     The function of stem cell therapy then, is to generate human body tissue, to keep it 
working, unaltered and healthy, and eventually to intervene and repair the cells around 
it. In this case, if these are damaged by a pathological condition of the tissue, they will 
be substituted through a transplant of healthy cells, prepared for the purpose in vitro. 
     It follows from this that stem cell therapy, if not used for the ends indicated above, 
but for other ends, in the present state of things, is not fulfilling its natural function. 
     In order to make the point on the function of stem cells used in relative therapies, it 
is necessary to make a fundamental distinction. It is a necessary distinction on their 
origin in that it qualifies their legitimacy for use in such therapies or indicates a limit to 
their use. The plan shown below, to indicate legitimacy and limits in stem cell 
treatment, prescribes a quadruple fundamental distinction which regards the different 
types of stem cells: 
      a - autologous or endogenous adult stem cells 
      b - heterologous or exogenous adult stem cells  
      c - umbilical cord stem cells 
      d -  embryonic stem cells 
     Those under a) come from the person for whom the stem therapy is intended; those 
under b) come from another person, who can be defined as a compatible donor; those 
under c) come from the umbilical cord of a new mother, and can be preserved and used 
by herself or can be donated to a third party; those under d) come from embryos. 
2. Legitimacy and limits of stem cell therapy with adult stem cells 
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The legitimacy and/or limits of stem cell therapy are seen in relation to the health of the 
person and are realized in therapeutic activity and experimental therapeutic activity. The 
question then, turns around the notion of “person”, and therefore the rights of the 
person; the most relative ones here are the right to life and the right to health. 
     Certain conditions therefore need to be respected for stem cell therapy to be 
appropriate; the benefits should outweigh the risks, health facilities should be fit to 
practise such treatment, the patient should give his or her informed consent, the cells 
should be freely given, the continuing function of the body. 
     It is important for a framework of stem cell therapy to keep in mind the distinction 
between the donor and the recipient. 
a – The donor should respect the principle that parts of the human body cannot be 
sources of profit. This principle is valid when an organ is removed unexpectedly, as 
well as when it is planned. In the first case the parts of the body removed, «naturally or 
out of therapeutic necessity, are goods, in as far as the interests of the subject in 
disposing of them are recognized, at least in the sense of deciding their destination».
1
 In 
the second case «the person has the right to make a contract with which the donation is 
decided.[…]. A transaction involving something other than property should be subject 
to a judgement in merit of the interests pursued, a judgement which pertains to the 
function and character of the transaction, rather than to the legitimizing situation: 
wishing the part to be detached, determining its destination for altruistic reasons, for 
clinical or experimental medicine or for scientific research, is deserving of protection, 
as long as the transaction is free, freely given and informed».
2
 
     Obviously the notion of person assumes that the subject concerned has reached the 
age of majority considered according to «a principle of organic unification and dynamic 
organization that guides the uninterrupted development»
3
 of a new being of the human 
species from the time of the fusion of all the stem cell chromosomes. If, on the other 
                                                     
1
 P. D’ADDINO SERRAVALLE, word Corpo (atti di disposizione del), in Enciclopedia di Bioetica e Scienza 
Giuridica, III, Napoli, ESI, 2010, p. 555. 
2
 Ibid., p. 556. 
3
 L. PALAZZANI, word Persona, in Enciclopedia di Bioetica e Scienza Giuridica, X, Napoli, ESI, 2016, p. 
310. 
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hand, he or she has not reached majority the subject is helped by a legal guardian, 
according to the degree of his or her development. Consequently, for people who have 
not reached majority the decision on whether stem cell therapy can be used can only be 
reached juridically. 
b – The recipient. Stem cell treatment comes into the framework of the principle of the 
aim of any health treatment; the protection of the patient’s life and the care of his health. 
Consequently, stem cell therapy must respect the requirements and the limits of 
legitimacy lain down for its practice and experimentation, which is why it is practicable 
if the benefits appear to be greater than the risks and if the facilities where the therapy 
takes place are fit. In addition, the patient, informed on the therapy, must have given his 
consent, which must also be informed. As for experimental therapy, finally, it should 
only be used as a last resort for treating the patient and if it is the only treatment capable 
of restoring the patient’s health.  
 
3. Legitimacy and limits of stem cell therapy with umbilical cord stem cells 
 
As for stem cell therapy with umbilical cord stem cells, the question centres around 
whether they are legally available. Or rather to answering the question of the most 
appropriate legal treatment of the detached part of the body.  First of all it should be 
remembered that a part of the body’s organism must be detached, and this could be 
unexpected or deliberate and planned. 
a – If it is unexpected the part which is detached, naturally or out of therapeutic 
necessity, is defined as goods, in as much as the subject, from whose body the part was 
detached, has the right to dispose of it, «at least in the sense of deciding its destination 
(re-joining of the displaced organ, subjection of the part to clinical examination, 
conservation of the umbilical cord for her own child or alienation of the same for 
altruistic purposes, etc.; in any case, the person from whose body the part is detached 
must be informed and consent to its different use)».
4
 However, parts detached from the 
body unexpectedly may not be used for profit.  
                                                     
4
 P. D’ADDINO SERRAVALLE, word Corpo (atti di disposizione del), cit., p. 555 e ss. 
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b – In the second case it does not represent the presence of a new asset but the person in 
question can put into place a legal transaction aimed at the regulation of personal and 
existential interests. This transaction should be characterized by freedom and awareness 
and will not be of a financial nature, it will not be the subject of a secret agreement for 
the use of the ‘goods’, even in the case of transplant sex mortuo. 
     In such a scenario the commodification of parts of the human body or its organs 
could lead to the attribution of a price to the human body and would compromise man’s 
identity and so his life. 
     The umbilical cord, once detached from the woman’s body, ceases to belong to her 
personal rights and assumes the figure of res, of which she immediately acquires 
ownership and can therefore use as she wishes. She can decide:  
    a – to keep it for herself so as to use its stem cells for her own benefit or for the 
benefit of the new-born of for other members of the family; 
    b – to donate it to others for the use of its stem cells; 
    c – to abandon it, with the consequence that others, becoming owners by possession, 
can use the stem cells from its blood. 
     The use of umbilical stem cells, then, qualifies as juridically legitimate if it is given 
for the common good, or if it is kept for the use of the woman from whose childbirth it 
derived. It can be destined then for a use which can be defined as heterologous or as 
autologous. 
 
4. Limits of stem cell therapy with embryonic stem cells 
 
The question becomes more complicated if, regarding the principles which guide the 
development of a new human being, it involves the embryo phase, that is therapy with 
embryonic stem cells. In fact, such cells are present only temporarily, at an early stage, 
during the development of the embryo in utero and there is no way of isolating them 
without causing its death, and would put it into the category of involuntary donors. We 
are reduced then to the sad expedient of producing embryos in the laboratory with the 
specific purpose of isolating and extracting the stem cells, in the knowledge that the 
Maria Lucia Tarantino 
 
184 
embryo will die as a consequence. Embryos produced in laboratories in such a way are 
sacrificed at the altar of a certain way of interpreting science. 
     Neither is it sufficient in order to justify such sacrifice to talk about therapeutic 
cloning, with the aim of providing embryonic stem cells for treating neurodegenerative 
diseases, in as much as the cure is not for the benefit of the embryo. It would not be out 
of place, then, to talk about a “holocaust” of embryos, sacrificed for the convenience of 
science. But, in such a case the illegitimacy of stem cell therapy with embryonic stem 
cells is clear to see. 
     Scientists who do not ideologically share the principle discussed above according to 
which a new human being’s existence begins at the moment of singamia, that is the 
moment that the fusion of all the chromosomes of the germinal cells is complete, are 
obviously of a different point of view 
     Anyway, therapeutic cloning, the production of embryonic stem cells to be used in 
neurodegenerative disease treatment, has been shown to be incapable of providing the 
intended therapeutic programmes. At the present stage of development, then, embryonic 
stem cell therapy would not be advisable for any disease, unlike what is happening with 
the reprogramming of adult stem cells. This is true to such an extent that it is accepted 
that the reprogramming of these cells «constitutes the future of regenerative therapy».
5
 
 
PART TWO 
Summary: 1 – Stem cell therapy and paradigms of the nature of man; 2 – A summa divisio of the 
paradigms of the nature of man; 3 – Two generations of partial paradigms of the nature of man. 
 
1. Stem cell therapy and paradigms of the nature of man  
Recourse to stem cell therapy as a health treatment for man and the question of the 
legitimacy and limits of such therapy discussed in Part One is connected to the classical, 
traditional concept of the nature of man which represents it in all its dimensions known 
in their structural and existential reality. 
                                                     
5
 F. MANTOVANI, La terapia staminale: problemi e limiti giuridici, in «Iustitia», LXVIII, 1, 2015, p. 8. 
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     The problem now is to see whether such therapy is logically compatible with each 
paradigm of the nature of man, or if each paradigm, bearer of its own ontological 
structure and existential manifestation, requires stem cell therapy with different ends. 
     In short, the problem is anthropological and consists of knowing if it is necessary to 
use a stem cell therapy for each paradigm of the nature of man, or if a single therapy can 
be suitable for all paradigms. 
     Today, in fact, we are seeing two different concepts of the nature of man, one which 
represents it in all its known dimensions, and the other which does not represent it in all 
of those dimensions and, to go further, represents it in a different way. 
     So, in the present doctrine there are two concepts of the nature of man, which are 
different in that one represents all the dimensions of his nature including the 
metaphysical, while the other represents an idea of it which does not recognize the 
metaphysical side. What is more, in the latter concept some aspects are represented as 
having different functions, for example reason. 
     In particular, the traditional and classical concept which represents the nature of man 
in all its known dimensions is that of ontologically founded realism which has been 
constructed over history from the ideas of realism of Aristotle, of St. Thomas, of 
Maritain, and recently, in Bioethics, with the ontologically founded realism defined by 
E. Sgreccia.
6
 
     It can be said, therefore, that this concept of the nature of man is a complete concept, 
total, in as much as it represents the nature of man in all its known dimensions, in 
particular including the metaphysical dimension.  
     Such a dimension, I repeat, is not present in the dimensions of the concept of the 
nature of man presented by those philosophers who, in representing it conceptually, did 
not consider it as an aspect of man’s nature, even though they recognized its existence, 
and at times did so with a sense of inconvenience. The doctrinal position of these 
philosophers is that, as well as not recognizing this dimension, they attribute different 
                                                     
6
 E. SGRECCIA, Manuale di bioetica. I: Fondamenti ed etica biomedica, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2000, p. 
63 e ss. 
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functions to some other dimensions from those recognized by the classical concept of 
the nature of man. Reason, for example, is reduced from a guide to freedom to an 
instrument of measuring, calculating and organizing; from a cognitive power which, 
ignoring the difference between intellect and reason, is reduced to a cognitive faculty 
formed only by reason as a tool which just measures, calculates and organizes. 
 
2. A summa divisio of the paradigms of the nature of man 
 
The brief picture of different paradigms of the nature of man, touched on in the 
preceding paragraph, allows me to make a summa divisio of them:  
a – views and conceptualizations of the nature of man in all its known dimensions,  
b – views and conceptualizations which do not represent the nature of man in all its 
known dimensions, and which in addition recognize different functions of some 
dimensions. 
     These two types of paradigms of the nature of man can be specified in this way: 
a – total paradigms of the nature of man 
b – partial paradigms of the nature of man.  
     The first find their greatest expression, as has been said, in the philosophical line of 
thought, Aristotle-Thomas-Maritain; while the second are found in various 
philosophical lines of thought which endorse one or other of the dimensions of the 
nature of man, but ignore the existence of the metaphysical dimension in the nature of 
man. This dimension has actually been defined by some philosophers as one which 
should be eliminated. I am referring, for example, to the well-known maxim Praeterea 
censeo metaphysicam esse delendam of the initiator of Scandinavian realism A. 
Hägeström. This maxim was used by him to justify his move from his initial Kantian 
position to the practice of realism as a collective psychic phenomena which accepts the 
existence of rights and duties as a different reality from that of the empiric, in which it 
would be possible to understand a right scientifically relying on facts.
7
 
                                                     
7
 The maxim quoted in the text can be found in vol. VII of the series Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in 
Selbstdarstellungen, Lipsia, Feliz Meiner, 1929. It is a maxim which paraphrases the famous words of 
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     This is a position which is shared today by those who, speaking of the nature of man, 
ask themselves rhetorically: but of which nature are we speaking? As if it and its 
definition were fruit of this or that culture, as if it were not true that the nature of man, 
considered in the harmony of its dimensions, was not one, and if multiple on the other 
hand, were not the views and conceptualisations which different philosophers have 
made of it. 
     Contrary to this philosophical fashion it needs to be emphasised that the dimensions 
of the nature of man are diverse, that of the biological, vital, that of the instincts, that of 
the senses, that of the affections, that of the interests, that of consciousness, the 
metaphysical dimension, etc. It should be remembered, in addition, that they should be 
considered as real, and not as something to be destroyed or not destroyed. Their practice 
can be accepted or denied, but in themselves they cannot be destroyed or considered 
inexistent. 
     Man, in this age of unchecked neoliberalism, cannot accept the sacrifice of his 
metaphysical side on the altar of unlimited freedom, lacking respect for one part of his 
nature and for others. Opting for such a choice means that man mutilates his nature. A 
human dimension cannot be destroyed. The existence of multiple dimensions of the 
nature of man should therefore be recognized. 
 
3. Two generations of partial paradigms of the nature of man 
 
I will mention only those partial paradigmatic views which have been such since their 
presentation. They are views which, considering their dissimilarity from the classic 
view of the nature of man could propose stem cell therapy with a different aim from that 
considered in Part One, which would appear to assume as its basis, without stating it, a 
sharing of the total view of the nature of man. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Cato the Censor: Cartago delenda est. On Hägeström’s antimetaphysical realism, see S. CASTIGNONE, La 
macchina del diritto. Il realismo giuridico in Svezia, Milano, Comunità, 1974. 
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     Partial paradigmatic views of the nature of man I would define respectively as first 
generation partial paradigmatic views and as second generation partial paradigmatic 
views. I would identify as first generation partial paradigmatic views: 
a – Hume’s view and conceptualisation of the nature of man, which sees it as a complex 
system composed of instincts and feelings, measured, calculated and organized by 
reason, seen as a cognitive faculty which through successive discursive step sex plains 
what it has seen, in other words reasons an instrument which just calculates, measures 
and organizes. 
b – Nietzsche’s view and conceptualisation, which sees the nature of man characterized 
by the predominance of the biological-vital sphere over reason, which is reduced to a set 
of «unreasonable forces which are claimed to be its basis»;
8
 
c – Freud’s view and conceptualisation, which points to the element which characterizes 
the nature of man as sexual impulse governed not by reason but by free will in all its 
manifestations, impulses which contribute to a person’s sublimation or to his total 
degradation. 
     All three of these paradigms continue to have at their base the written order of nature 
which together with culture program the life of the above described paradigms in the 
light of reason understood as an instrument. 
     The proponents of these three paradigmatic views could support, with consistency, 
stem cell therapy aimed in particular at treating and keeping intact and highly 
functioning the dimensions of the nature of man favoured by them, that is a 
strengthening of reason as an instrument, a strengthening of the will as the will to have 
power and a strengthening of libido. As for whether such therapies contribute to making 
humanity progress for the better only history will tell, and sometimes it has told, 
stimulated by extraordinary events determined by the need to not go beyond 
unsurmountable fixed points if we want human life to continue.  
                                                     
8
 A. TARANTINO, Natura dell’uomo e modelli di bioetica, Milano, Giuffré, 2016, p. 62. 
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     These paradigms, especially those of Nietzsche and Freud, have generated further 
paradigms, which are also reductive in terms of the nature of man. They are those of the 
second view. 
In the second generation partial paradigmatic view I would specify: 
a – the gender view  
b – the trans-human view 
c –the post human view 
     These new generation paradigmatic views are also characterized by the non-
recognition of the metaphysical aspect present in the classic concept of the nature of 
man. These too then give a reduced view compared to what it is in its effective reality. 
This is a reduction which narrows the reality of the view of man to only a part of his 
actual activity. 
     Of these paradigms, generated by the first three, the first two have now become 
“accepted” in civil and juridical society; now we have the problem of the “acceptance” 
of the paradigm of the post human. This last is a view and conceptualisation of the 
nature of man, which, if translated in its entirety, at a juridical level, amounts to a 
material element of crimes against the human race, inasmuch as with its structure and its 
programmed capacity for reproduction, it would be an attack on the structure of the 
human race as it has been known from its first beginnings.  
     With the post-human, in fact, with continual recourse to artificial intelligence, etc., 
we are no longer dealing with experimental science which becoming technology is 
humanized, a fact which allows us to remain in the trans-human,
9
 but we are looking at 
cyber organic interventions in the human organism, causing it to lose its identity as 
belonging to the human species. Not surprising, then, if the converging technologies 
(NBIC) which coming together in working for technological technical enhancement,
10
 
could end up making human individuals lose their identity. Now, faced with this danger 
                                                     
9
 See J.M. GALVÁN, voce Cyborg, in Enciclopedia di Bioetica e Scienza Giuridica, III, Napoli, ESI, 2010, 
p. 786. 
10
 See L. PALAZZANI, Il potenziamento umano. Tecnoscienza, etica e diritto, Torino, Giappichelli, 2015, 
p. 122 e ss. The acronym NBIC used in the text refers to nanotechnology, to Biotechnology, to 
information technology and to cognitive science. 
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it is justified that in order to protect the dignity of the human race and its individuals, 
such human life programmes should be considered a material element of crime against 
the human race, as has been the case for reproductive cloning and eugenics.
11
 
     These possibilities derive from the fact that, both in the case of first generation 
paradigms and in those of the second generation of the nature of man, things are no 
longer seen in their rational foundation, but as entities cut loose from their substratum. 
     In the second generation paradigms, moreover, the nature of man in itself can play 
no role in specifying an eventual stem cell therapy, but it would be culture that would 
decide each time what the aim of recourse to such a therapy could be. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 Eugenics and reproductive cloning, in fact, are specified, in the second book (of crimes and offences 
against the person), under subtitle II of the French Code Pénal - 2005, as crimes against the human race; 
crimes which in this code are distinct from those against humanity, which are otherwise specified, under 
subtitle I of the same book. 
 
